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RECONCILING L.L.N. V. CLAUDER AND
PRITZLAFF V. ARCHDIOCESE OF
MILWAUKEE: DOES THIS MEAN




What damn'd error but some sober brow
Will bless it, and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?1
In recent years, the public has been more open to discussion and ac-
ceptance of charges for sexual misconduct among the clergy.2 From
1982 to 1992, the legal and medical costs of litigating sexual misconduct
claims have cost the Roman Catholic church more than $400 million.3
Significant cases have settlements of about one million dollars.4
Religious organizations had, until recently, an inveterate tradition of
dealing with this issue under their own doctrines and canons. This tra-
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 3, se. 2 lines 83-86
(Horace Howard Furness ed., 9th ed. 1888).
2. Sexual misconduct can refer to any sexual exploitation whether it occurs with an
adult parishioner or a minor.
For the purposes of this Comment, "clergy" or "priest" will be used interchangeably,
depending on the religion involved and will represent any member of a religious organiza-
tion. The definition of "clergy" or "priest" will include "[a] person who becomes a cleric
through the reception of diaconate and ... [by being] incardinated into the particular church
or personal prelature for whose service he has been advanced." Jill Fedje, Liability For Sex-
ual Abuse: The Anomalous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 133, 133 n.2 (1990)
(quoting Raymond C. O'Brien, Pedophilia: The Legal Predicament of Clergy, 4 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 91, 92 n.5 (1988)). Furthermore, a member of the "clergy" in this in-
stance may refer to any religious organization, such as a priest, rabbi, or minister.
3. Jeffrey Anderson, Visiting the Sins of the Fathers Upon the Church: A View from the
Victim's Lawyer, Tort Liability for Charitable, Religious and Non-Profit Institutions, A.B.A.
Torts & Ins. Practice Sec., Ch. E at 2 (1992). From 1984 to 1994, over 400 Catholic priests in
North America were accused of molesting children. See Elizabeth Fernandez et. al., Cop
Report Says Priest Molested Altar Boys, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 21,1994, at A-1.
4. See Peter Bronson, Predator in a Priest's Collar, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 31, 1994, at
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dition has led to the public's belief that there is a "culture of silence"
that covers up clergy sexual misconduct and reassigns clergy who com-
mit sexual misconduct to new positions in which they may again commit
the offense.5 Today, with such wide media coverage, sexual misconduct
within the clergy is something the public and courts no longer ignore.
While traditionally courts chose to give religious organizations im-
munity from civil intrusion,7 the recent national trend is to hold relig-
ious organizations accountable for a variety of sexual misconduct their
clergy commit.8 This issue divides the judicial system about what, if any,
conduct of a religious organization is governable by civil laws. If a court
is to attempt to impose liability on religious organizations for their
clergy's acts, it must strike a careful balance between honoring the con-
stitutional protection of religious freedom-which allow religious or-
ganizations to be self-governing-and holding these dioceses account-
able for their clergy's sexual misconduct.9
Wisconsin has not been without its share of lawsuits that attempt re-
covery from a religious organization for its clergy's acts of sexual mis-
conduct.0 In July 1996, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals released an
5. See, e.g., JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION: CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND
THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1992) (alleging that a Louisiana Catholic Diocese cov-
ered up a child abuse sex scandal).
6. The religious organizations, both because of the misconduct and the threat of law-
suits, are taking a more active role against clergy's sexual misconduct. Several are imple-
menting new policies to deal firmly with sexual abusers. See, e.g., Thomas F. Taylor, Will
Your Church Be Sued? How to Anticipate and Avoid Lawsuits in an Age of Litigation Over-
kill, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 6, 1997, at 42; see also Jeffery L. Sheler & Sarah Burke, The
Unpardonable Sin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 16,1992, at 94.
7. Thomas Jefferson is often cited for constructing the wall between church and state
with his statement that the government is "interdicted by the Constitution from intermed-
dling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline or exercises." James T. O'Reilly &
Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduc" Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and
Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 31, 44 (1994) (quoting Letter from Tho-
mas Jefferson to Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CON-
STITUTION 98 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
8. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 31. Some plaintiffs have attempted to re-
cover under some imaginative theories. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (1997)
(claiming there existed a civil conspiracy between the priest and diocese).
9. This balancing act was eloquently described in State ex rel Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d
99 (Tenn. 1975), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, "[e]ssentially, therefore, the
problem becomes one of a balancing of the interests between religious freedom and the
preservation of the health, safety and morals of society. The scales must be weighed in favor
of religious freedom, and yet the balance is delicate." Id. at 111.
10. The cases discussed in this Comment are not the only ones Wisconsin has to decide
on this or similar issues. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94 (Wis.
1997) (involving six men and one woman who claimed that priests sexually abused them and
wanted the Milwaukee Archdiocese to pay damages for emotional distress). Justice Janine
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opinion that arguably opened the door to religious organization's liabil-
ity for its clergy's sexual misconduct. In L.L.N. v. Clauder,n the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals found that neither the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment12 nor Wisconsin case law' barred L.L.N.'s claim
for negligent supervision against the religious organization." On ap-
peal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
barred claims of negligent supervision against religious organizations.
Before L.L.N., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee"5 that Wisconsin does not generally recognize
a religious organization's liability for the sexual misconduct of its
clergy. 6 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in L.L.N. then found that
L.L.N.'s claim of negligent supervision against a religious organization
for the sexual misconduct of its clergy was an exception to the Pritzlaff
rule and allowed the claim. 7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in L.L.N.,
held that "the First Amendment precludes L.L.N.'s claim for negligent
supervision" and put this issue to rest.I8 Because religious organizations
fail to react strongly when a clergy member is accused of sexual mis-
conduct, 9 because liable clergy members use their positions to manipu-
late a victim.' and because victims need compensation to pay for treat-
P. Geske held, inter alia that: (1) the statute of limitations accrued at the time the abuse oc-
curred for victims of repressed memories; (2) the supreme court would not extend limitations
period beyond that provided for in the statute covering suits by adults bringing claims for
injuries incurred while they were minors.
11. 552 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997).
12. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Thus, this statement contains both
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. One can assume, however, to the
extent that a rule of law may influence a religious organization's future decisions, that rule
may also inhibit the religious organization's free exercise of religion.
13. For its defense, the Diocese in L.L.N. primarily relied on Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).
14. See L.L.N., 552 N.W.2d at 886.
15. 533 N.W.2d at 780.
16. Id. at 790-91. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also found that the discovery rule
barred the plaintiff's claim, so the statute of limitation had expired. Id. at 790; see also Stacy
C. Gerber Ward, Sexual Misconduct Claims and the Discovery Rule, WiS. LAW., JULY 1996,
at 24.
17. L.L.N., 552 N.W.2d at 885.
18. 563 N.W.2d 434,445 (Wis. 1997).
19. Jill Fedje gives an interesting and horrifying discussion of how churches have
shielded their clergy from liability and perpetuated abuse. See Fedje, supra note 2, at 13641.
20. "Sexual exploitation is not as much about sex as it is about the abuse of power ....
It is where ... power is exercised in the name or context of religion, that the civil law is
properly and forcefully stepping in." O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 37 (quoting Don-
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ment to recover from this kind of abuse,21 it is clear that there is a policy
issue dictating that given the right circumstances victims should be able
to recover from religious organizations for egregious acts of negligent
supervision. More importantly, this claim, when followed strictly,
would pass constitutional muster. This Comment asserts that the Wis-
consin Supreme Court needlessly misinterpreted L.L.N.'s claim under
the First Amendment to immunize religious organizations, and that the
court should have allowed the claim because of the secular nature of the
supervision in this situation.
Part II of this Comment discusses the basic principles that courts use
to review claims against religious organizations and discusses the differ-
ent levels of constitutional review that exist on the federal and state
levels. Part III discusses briefly some various theories of recovery that
parishioners use to attempt to recover from a religious entity resulting
from acts of its clergy and addresses why most of them are not viable
legal claims. Part IV reviews the background of Wisconsin case law in
this area and reviews the decision in L.L.N. Part V offers an evaluation
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in L.L.N., as well as propose
how Wisconsin could have handled claims against religious organiza-
tions so not to violate federal and state constitutions.
This Comment contends this issue is important because victims need
to pay for treatment. Also, courts should hold religious organizations
liable because religious organizations' tradition of dealing with this
problem has failed, and the religious immunity afforded in the Constitu-
tion does not protect religious organizations from negligently supervis-
ing their clergy. Furthermore, this Comment contends Wisconsin was
correct in not following other jurisdictions by allowing multiple, and far
more intrusive, theories of recovery that violate federal and state consti-
tutions. Negligent supervision is the only theory of recovery Wisconsin
should have allowed because it is the only theory that does not violate
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment or the Wisconsin Consti-
tution.
II. CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND LEVELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Any proposed claim in this area of law must first address whether
the First Amendment allows the claim. Religious organizations will use
aid C. Clark, Sexual Abuse in the Churcv The Law Steps In, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 14,
1993, at 396-97).
21. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 37.
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the First Amendment, and any state constitutional provisions, as their
foremost defense. Thus, a court must determine whether the First
Amendment bars a parishioner's cause of action.' This section will
briefly summarize some general principles used in this type of analysis
and the development of the different levels of constitutional review.
There are a few basic principles that courts use as groundwork. This
analysis begins with a brief passage from the Constitution that contains
the Religion Clauses. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' '  This
language is the extent of both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. Because the language is broad, and the freedoms pro-
tected by them overlap, courts often confuse their analysis of this area
of law.24
Any religious organization's defense should include a claim under
the Free Exercise Clause, that the religious organization has a right to
22. See Cassandra Butler, Church Tort Liability in Spite of First Amendment Protection,
12 S.U. L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1985). Butler argued in 1985 that the gradual lowering of the
shield provided to religious organizations by the First Amendment was a sign of things to
come and that the Supreme Court would continue to gradually weaken religious organiza-
tions' First Amendment rights. Id. at 38.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. Courts' analyses diverge at this point. Most courts agree that the issue is constitu-
tional in nature and that the First Amendment is the appropriate body of law to apply, but
they disagree on whether the right doctrine is the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise
Clause. See Butler, supra note 22, at 43-45.
Courts usually apply the Free Exercise Clause in situations in which an individual or in-
stitution is attempting to exercise an aspect of their religion conflicting with state or federal
law. See, eg., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 146
(1987) (holding Florida's refusal to pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist
who was discharged when she said she could not work on Saturday violated her Free Exer-
cise Rights); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 708-09 (1981) (Indiana's denial of em-
ployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who left a job at a munitions factory based on his
religious objections to war violated the Free Exercise Clause.); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972) ("The essence of all that has been said and written [about the Free Exercise
Clause] is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (An employee did not want to work on Saturday because it was against her relig-
ious principles.).
Courts usually use the Establishment Clause when the government has taken some kind
of positive action to benefit or hinder a specific religion. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947) (in which state money used to pay for bussing children to parochial
schools was found to violate the Establishment Clause). Arguably, the Establishment Clause
could bar people in the Free Exercise Claims from recovery if a court found that enforcing
Free Exercise in these situations favors religion over non religion. This paradox uncovers
the extreme overlap in the Religion Clauses. Conversely, when a court may allow state ac-
tion in light of the Establishment Clause (state action passes the standard of review), that
action will undoubtedly burden that institution's free exercise of religion.
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exercise its religion without government interference. Consequently,
when a state law or a court begins to grant the religious organization
too broad a protection, a plaintiff or a court may decide to raise the is-
sue that this protection is the equivalent of an establishment of religion
(thus raising the Establishment Clause).# One reason for the Estab-
lishment Clause is to keep government from helping or hindering a par-
ticular religion.' However, Wisconsin case law in this area has primar-
ily focused on evaluation of the Free Exercise ClauseY Therefore, this
Comment assumes that a court's analysis of a religious organization's
defense would focus on the Free Exercise Clause, and a court's claim
that a religious organization has too much immunity could fall under an
Establishment Clause analysis.' Because both Clauses may be used in a
court's analysis, and courts often confuse the constitutional analysis of
these defenses, this Comment will review principles and levels of consti-
tutional review for both Clauses.
A. Free Exercise Clause
In Wisconsin and nationally, the level of constitutional review a
court uses in free exercise claims that possibly interfere with church
doctrine has endured some change in recent years. Under the tradi-
tional and federal First Amendment constitutional level of review, 3 a
25. This is an example of the point-counterpoint functions of the Religion Clauses. Fur-
ther, it is an example of why the decision of which clause to apply, as well as the levels of
constitutional review to be applied for each clause, is sometimes troublesome for courts.
26. The Supreme Court in Everson found:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
son can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The Court is trying to mark a boundary between permissible and
impermissible governmental actions regarding religion.
27. See generally State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 1995); Block v. Gomez, 549 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996); Jocz v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
28. Sherbert dictates that a Free Exercise inquiry involves a court deciding: (1) Does
the law burden the free exercise of religion?; and (2) Is there a compelling state interest
served by the law? See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 405.
29. Courts often perform an overly-broad analysis, incorporating principles from the
Religion Clauses instead of focusing on one clause. See, e.g., Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d
450, 454-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879, 886 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996).
30. The Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, was incorporated into the Four-
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court would apply a heightened standard of review for claims that pos-
sibly interfere with religious doctrine." Thus, a plaintiff in an action in
which state law may intrude on religious doctrine would have to prove
that there was a compelling state interest in the controversy and that
the state's suggested solution was the least restrictive means of intrud-
ing upon the church's doctrine?2 A court may then apply the Supreme
Court's distinction between the ideas of the absolute freedom to believe
and the freedom to act." While the freedom to believe is unlimited, a
society must limit the freedom to act for its own protection' For ex-
ample, in a tort action, a court must balance35 the protection of society
against the Constitution's mandate that government not entangle itself
with church affairs.
The compelling state interest/least restrictive means test was the
federal standard of review until the decision of Employment Division v.
Smith' in which the Supreme Court found that a federal court,38 while
teenth Amendment meaning that the First Amendment is applicable to the states. Everson,
330 U.S. at 5.
31. The compelling interest test was set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-
15 (1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402-03 (1963).
32. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the
government interest of ending discrimination outweighed burden on school's exercise of re-
ligious beliefs); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,457-58 (1982) (ruling that the government
may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (holding that only interests of
the highest order can overcome legitimate claims of free exercise of religion).
33. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303-04 (1940).
34. Id.
35. This balancing test is set forth in Sherbert in which governmental actions that sub-
stantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a "compelling governmental inter-
est." 374 U.S. at 402-03 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). This com-
pelling interest test is also set forth in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15.
36. "[E]xcessive government entanglement with religion" is the key phrase coined in
Lemon v. Kurtzman to signify when the government or a court has crossed the line (drawn
by the Establishment Clause) and has violated the Constitution by involving themselves in
what should be purely ecclesiastical issues. 406 U.S, 602, 613 (1970). The Lemon test has
been criticized for being used only when it is convenient, and has also been criticized for
lacking real meaning. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia here refers to the test in Lemon as "some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, af-
ter being repeatedly killed and buried, [and] Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause juris-
prudence one again, frightening the little children and school attorneys ... ." Id. at 398.
37. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, claimants sought review of the determination that
their religious use of peyote, which resulted in their dismissal from employment, was
"misconduct" which disqualified them from unemployment insurance. Id. at 874-76. The
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon
drug laws and that the state could deny unemployment benefits. ld. at 890. Therefore, the
Free Exercise Clause did not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a facially
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:611
analyzing religious conduct brought into dispute, could apply "neutral
principles of general applicability."39 This lowered the standard of re-
view in federal courts, dictating that a plaintiff challenging a religious
organization no longer needed to meet the compelling state inter-
est/least restrictive means test.4° The federal standard established in
Smith is known as the "law of general applicability test" in which courts
may apply neutral laws of general applicability to religious practices.4'
Answering this Supreme Court decision, Congress enacted the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 42  RFRA was
Congress' attempt to restore the heightened standard of review that ex-
isted before Smith.4 ' Hence, the federal standard under RFRA replaced
neutral law of general applicability.
38. This is now the standard of review for federal courts. See State v. Miller, 549
N.W.2d 235, 239-41 (Wis. 1996). State courts can either adopt this or use their state constitu-
tional standard if it is an equivalent or stricter standard. Id at 238-39.
39. The Court specifically found that the rights offered by the Free Exercise Clause do
not "relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)."' Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
40. The Supreme Court found that the only claims that would not allow neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws were ones that involved the Free Exercise Clause coupled with another
constitutional protection. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
41. Thus, a "compelling governmental interest" inquiry would not be allowed in free
exercise challenges because it would require judges to determine "centrality" of religious
beliefs in applying the compelling interest test in the free exercise context. Id. at 884-85
(limiting the Sherbert balancing test to unemployment compensation field). See also Julia E.
Pusateri, Note, Church of LuKumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah: The Burdening of
Free Exercise: The Solidification of the Employment Division v. Smith Doctrine and the Con-
gressional Response, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1041 (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) In General.-Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
b) Exception.-Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of relig-
ion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in-
terest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The Act's findings and purposes state, in relevant part:
Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that-
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Consti-
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the original standard of the compelling interest/least restrictive means
test.44 After the enactment of RFRA, courts across the nation applied
either standard, depending on whether courts in that jurisdiction had
found RFRA constitutional.'
In City of Boerne, v. Mores, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was
tution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith.... the Supreme Court virtually elimi-
nated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exer-
cise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and com-
peting prior governmental interest.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) ... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free ex-
ercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substan-
tially burdened by government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(b).
44. Academics met Congress's enactment of RFRA with mixed reviews. See Carl H.
Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Con-
flict or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 584-85 (1995) (Rules regarding religious free-
dom and the First Amendment are multidimensional and require more inquiry than other
rights analysis.); see also Wendy S. Whitbeck, Restoring Rites and Rejecting Wrongs: The Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act, 18 SETON HALL L. J. 821,822-23 (1994).
45. This depended on whether courts in the area vigorously applied RFRA. This may
have been determined by the judge, panel, or nature of the claim. For example, in Sullivan v.
Sasnett, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (Oct. 29, 1996),
vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997), the Seventh Circuit held that RFRA is a valid
exercise of Congress's power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh
Circuit must now reconsider Sullivan in light of City of Boerne v. Flores. Conversely, in
Keeler v. Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996), the court held that RFRA exceeds
Congress's power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and violates the separa-
tion of powers. See also Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act" Pushing
the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 256 (1994). Clearly, City of Boerne v.
Flores has eliminated this issue by holding that RFRA is unconstitutional in regards to state
claims. 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997), rev'g, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). Whether RFRA
is unconstitutional with regards to federal claims is an open question. The Eighth Circuit will
soon decide whether RFRA restricts federal law. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997). "In
Boerne, the Court ruled RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state law. So the question re-
maining in [this] case was whether federal law-in this case bankruptcy law-is restricted by
the act." David E. Rovella, Tithing Topic for Courts, Congress, NAT. LJ., Dec. 22, 1997, at
A6.
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unconstitutional in regard to state law.46 Specifically, the Court held
that RFRA added substantive matter to the Fourteenth Amendment
which overstepped the bounds of Congress' enforcement power under
Section 5.47 The Court found that RFRA's claim of enforcing the con-
stitutional right to freedom of religion, via the compelling state inter-
est/least restrictive means test, actually changed "what the right is." '
Thus, RFRA was not a proper exercise of Congress' remedial power
because it was too strong a remedy for claims in state courts against re-
ligious freedom.49 Furthermore, RFRA is ineffective because it "is not
designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitu-
tional because of their treatment of religion." Accordingly, RFRA's
standard of review is inapplicable to state laws.
State courts must also consider the standard their state's constitu-
tion mandates, for a state's constitutional standard can be higher than
the federal standard. For example, in State v. Miller,"1 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided that the state constitutional standard provided
greater protection than the federal Constitution." The court then ap-
plied the compelling state interest/least restrictive means test to ensure
greater protection." A court's analysis may also begin with a determi-
nation of whether the conduct in question is secular, versus
46. 117 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
48. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
49. The Court elaborated on the enormity of RFRA's power:
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional be-
havior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protec-
tions. Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate
when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional
enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.... Sweeping
coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject
matter.
Id. at 2170 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 2171.
51. See WIS. CONST. art I, § 18. This provision is called the Freedom of Conscience
Clause and provides in relevant part: "The right of every person to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; ... nor shall any control of,
or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted." Id.
52. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Wis. 1996). In Miller, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court found that that interpretation of the First Amendment does not constrain the
state's constitutional right to worship is. Id. at 239.
53. Id. at 240.
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"ministerial" or "ecclesiastical." If a court determines the conduct is
purely secular55 or outside religious doctrine, the analysis is like that of
any other action.' If the court finds the conduct "ministerial" or
"ecclesiastical," then a court, depending on the jurisdiction, may use a
different level of constitutional review.7 This determination can be a
stumbling block for a court attempting to review an act of a religious
organization.
While extreme cases are easy, the fundamental troubles for courts
are situations in which, for example, a priest is acting as a secular coun-
selor. Logically, it seems that a priest would be unable to separate his
54. Jocz v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 588, 598 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995). Here, the court found that a "determination [of ]whether an activity is religious or
secular' must give considerable, if not decisive weight to the religion's own vision of the dis-
tinction." Id. at 598 (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 142 (1994)). Carter
explains that an American culture that marginalizes religion and emphasizes the separation
of church and state is unnecessary and that the two can coexist without one taking a back
seat to the other. Id.
55. The general test in Wisconsin for defining whether employment is secular or
"ministerial" is if "'the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in relig-
ious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered [ministerial or ecclesiastical]."' Jocz,
538 N.W.2d at 598 (quoting Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164-69 (4th Cir. 1985)).
56. In fact, this is how many courts avoid a more complicated standard of review. For
example, in cases of sexual abuse, a court will decide that sexual abuse is automatically out-
side the realm of church doctrine. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310,321
(Colo. 1993) (A plaintiff must plead that the relationship was a "matter of purely ecclesiasti-
cal concern.").
While this analysis may be correct regarding the defendant clergyman, it becomes far
more complicated as applied to a religious organization. How can a court determine that a
religious organization's conduct is not "ecclesiastical" regarding its actions towards a clergy-
man? See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 45-46.
The reconciliation and counseling of the errant clergy person involves more than a
civil employer's file reprimand or three day suspension without pay for misconduct.
Mercy and forgiveness of sin may be concepts familiar to bankers but they have no
place in the discipline of bank tellers. For clergy, they are interwoven in the institu-
tion's norms and practices.
Id; see also Karen Ann Ballotta, Comment, Losing Its Sou How the Cipolla Case Lim-
its the Catholic Church's Ability To Discipline Sexually Abusive Priests, 43 EMORY LJ. 1431,
1432 (1994) (Religious organizations have begun to revise their policies regarding sexual
abuse of clergy, but internal solutions must adhere to canon law.). Of course, it is the relig-
ious organization's traditional approach to discipline that has caused the uproar.
Others believe that when the religious organizations fail, it is left to the state to ensure
that appropriate measures are taken against offending clergy so that the sexual misconduct
does not recur. See Beth Wilbourn, Note, Suffer the Children" Catholic Church Liability for
the Sexual Abuse Acts of Priests, 15 REV. LITIG. 251,252 (1996).
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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religious beliefs from his counseling, and therefore his job would be at
least partly "ministerial."58 Purely secular behavior is even more diffi-
cult to determine when a court intends to evaluate the administrative
actions of a religious organization.59 This distinction gives courts a tre-
mendous degree of discretion and the ability to mold the legal reason-
ing to fit the court's desired outcome. Arguably, a court, in reviewing a
religious organization's decisions, will be involving itself, at least in part,
in religious doctrine.'o This Comment asserts that when it is unclear
whether the conduct is "ministerial" or "secular," as it will usually be
when a religious organization is involved, a court should assume that
the conduct is "ministerial" or "ecclesiastical," unless a plaintiff can
clearly establish secular behavior. This apparently harsh presumption
counterbalances the liabilities that a court eventually may have to im-
pose on a religious organization.
B. The Establishment Clause
Again, one of the purposes of the Establishment Clause is to protect
religious organizations from state or federal governments helping or
hindering a religious institution. The immunities the Establishment
Clause grants to religious organizations to be free from government in-
trusion, however, is limited. First, the Establishment Clause does not
grant religious organizations blanket immunity from suit, but it does
prohibit civil courts from adjudicating controversies that would require
courts to interpret or decide matters of religious doctrine or faith.61 This
facet of the Establishment Clause reveals the core of this anomalous is-
sue, which is to decide when a claim requires interpretation of church
doctrine.
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court voiced some
58. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 43-45; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 21.12 (2d ed. 1992).
59. A court should not impute what it believes to be secular behavior of the clergy onto
the behavior of the religious organization. This appears to be what happens in many cases in
which a religious organization's employment decisions are immediately deemed secular. See
Moses, 863 P.2d at 321; see also Erickson v. Christenson 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that because a sexually abusive relationship arose out of a pastor's duties, he
was within the scope of his employment, and thus the church was responsible).
60. Undeniably, a religious organization's employment decisions will be interwoven
with church doctrine. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 43-45. While categorizing a
religious organization's behavior as secular may be an easy way out for a court, it also may
violate the First Amendment.
61. See Olston v. Hallock, 201 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Wis. 1972) (The Wisconsin Supreme
Court refused to review a priest's discharge because it was "outside the province of judicial
review.").
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specific prohibitions against the government. 2 One of these prohibi-
tions is that no state or federal government can set up an official church.
Another is that one may not be punished for his or her religious be-
liefs."3 Yet another, more appropriate restriction is that government
may not participate in the affairs of religious organizations.6 While the
Court in Everson claimed that these prohibitions came only from the
Establishment Clause, they are also protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. This is one example of the overlap of the two doctrines and
why courts sometimes confuse their application.
The Supreme Court developed a test in Lemon v. Kurtzman to de,
termine whether governmental action violates the Establishment
Clause."5 First, the governmental action must have a secular legislative
purpose. Second, the government action's primary effect must neither
advance nor inhibit religion. Finally, the government action must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.66 If the
government can satisfy each of the conditions, the action will be held
valid.67
The third "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test reflects
the principle that courts will strenuously avoid inquiry into the truth of
particular religious doctrines or practices. This is especially relevant re-
garding internal church affairs unless a court can apply neutral rules of
law to purely secular behavior. Although plaintiffs are entitled to judi-
cial review of their controversies, courts have no authority to resolve
questions that require judicial interpretation of religious doctrine. The
Supreme Court has been attempting to develop a standard to deal with
internal church affairs under the Establishment Clause for some time.68
One approach for determining if a plaintiff, court, or government is
excessively entangled in religious doctrine is the "neutral principles"
approach which arose in Jones v. Wolf.69 The issue in Jones, regarding a
property dispute, was whether civil courts, consistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause, "could resolve the dispute on the basis of 'neutral
62. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. Id. at 605. While this seems like a clear-cut test, its application has been problem-
atic. See supra note 58.
67. See Lemon, 403 U.S., at 602.
68. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLU-
RALISTIC SOCIETY 498-99 (1996).
69. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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principles of law,' or whether they must defer to the resolution of an
authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church."7 ° The principle in
Jones suggests that if an issue is completely secular in operation, a court
can apply "neutral principles of law," and if a court must resolve a re-
ligious controversy, a court must defer the resolution of the doctrinal
issue to the appropriate religious entity."
The question of what qualifies as a "neutral principle" of law is an
anomalous one. In Watson v Jones72 the Supreme Court classified, into
three headings, issues concerning religious organization's property
rights. This classification enables the court to determine whether a
court could hear cases regarding property rights.7 3 Although this case
predates the incorporation of the First Amendment to the states, these
classifications are still used today.
Jones v. Wolf suggests that under the Establishment Clause, civil
courts are not allowed to review the decisions of religious organizations,
and thus cannot analyze or interpret religious doctrine.75 However:
[C]ivil courts [can] adjudicate the rights under the [facts of the
case] without interpreting or weighing church doctrine but sim-
ply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review of a specific
church decision-i.e., whether that decision resulted from fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness. Such review does not inject the civil
70. Id. at 597.
71. Id. at 599.
72. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
73. Id. at 704.
74. One theory espouses that when property is conveyed for the purposes of religious
worship, a court will enforce it as a trust. Watson, 80 U.S. at 704. However, a court will not
determine what actions of a religious organization would create a "substantial departure"
from religious doctrine that may violate the initial grant of the trust. See Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969) (holding if intra-church property dispute required interpreting and weighing church
doctrine, a court could not intervene; if, however, neutral principles of law could be applied
without determining underlying questions of religious doctrine, a court could intervene).
75. 443 U.S. at 570. The appointment of a chaplain is one example. In Gonzales v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, the Supreme Court held that appointment of a chaplain was a
"canonical act, [and] it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essen-
tial qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possess them. 280 U.S. 1, 16
(1929). In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in liti-
gation before the secular courts as conclusive." Id. This is does not mean there is a general
exception for cases involving fraud, collusion or arbitrariness. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712-15 (1976) (forbidding judicial
inquiry into whether the churches decision-making body properly followed its own rules of
procedure in removing a bishop from office).
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courts into substantive ecclesiastical matters.6
Whether Jones applies only to property disputes is an open-ended
question, but courts have interpreted Jones to allow adjudication of any
claim that would likely arise out of a corporation.' This Comment as-
sumes for this argument that in Establishment Clause analysis, Jones
should be interpreted not only to apply to property disputes, but also to
disputes that would be likely to arise out of a corporation.78 Thus, civil
courts can narrowly review specific church decisions, if they are secular
in operation (i.e., the government will not be excessively entangling it-
self in religious doctrine), without violating the Establishment Clause.79
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Case law from across the nation offers a variety of recovery theories
used by plaintiffs injured by sexual misconduct of clergy attempting to
recover money damages from the religious institutions connected to the
injuring clergy. This section gives a brief overview of the various theo-
ries of recovery, with a focus on negligent supervision.' This section
also shows that no theory of recovery used against a religious organiza-
tion is completely separable from church doctrine. For any claim to be
constitutional in Wisconsin under a Free Exercise analysis, it must meet
a heightened standard of review. Furthermore, for a claim to survive
under an Establishment Clause analysis, a court must be able to apply
"neutral principles" of law. This Comment suggests the only theory
that can meet both these levels of constitutional review is negligent su-
pervision and that courts should analyze these claims in a fact intensive,
case-by-case analysis.
A. Clergy Malpractice
Clergy malpractice is similar to claims that arise in a counseling set-
76. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607. Thus, a review of a religious organization's decision must be
narrowly construed, and a court must not review whether a religious organization is following
its own doctrines. Id
77. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310,320 (Colo. 1993).
78. This follows the Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning in Moses. Id. at 320-21.
79. "Entanglement is a judicially proscribed overextension of government involvement,
including actions of the courts, into the beliefs and internal affairs of the religious institu-
tion." O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 45 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm's of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)).
80. For every theory of recovery, there are jurisdictions that are both for and against
allowing that recovery. See generally Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church or
Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1993).
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ting. Traditionally, courts recognize that a secular counselor owes a
duty of care to a patient.8 Because of the patient's vulnerability, the
counselor is in a position to possibly take advantage of a patient.8
Clergy malpractice follows the same theory. However, until recently,3
no court had allowed a cause of action for clergy malpractice.84 When a
court attempts to use this theory against a religious organization for its
clergy's acts, this theory fails. First, most courts have noted that im-
posing a professional standard of care on religious counselors is practi-
cally impossible 5 because it would force a court to create, for example,
a "reasonable bishop" norm that would necessarily require a court and
jury to interpret religious doctrine.86 This is true because implicit in
81. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,340 (Cal. 1976).
82. See, e.g., Block v. Gomez, 549 N.W.2d 783,785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
83. New Jersey is the first state to allow a cause of action for clergy malpractice on an
appellate level. See F.G. v. MacDonell, 677 A.2d 258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J.). In F.G., a woman sought counseling
from the minister of her church. Id. at 267. Another minister then subsequently revealed the
relationship to the parish during a sermon. Id The New Jersey Superior court stated, "[w]e
perceive no impenetrable barrier, on the limited record before us, to establishing a standard
of care applicable to cleric-counselors in the context of an allegation that the counselor used
his position to sexually exploit the counselee." Id. at 264. Apparently, this court believed
that an examination of the claim required no examination of church "dogma or ritual"; there-
fore, there existed no interference with the First Amendment. Id. at 264-65. On review, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that courts could, without invoking the First Amendment,
resolve a claim that a former rector, while being a pastoral counselor, breached his fiduciary
duty by invoking sexually inappropriate behavior. I&i at 701. The court also held a claim of
clergy malpractice raised First Amendment free exercise issues; therefore, that claim was
barred. Id. at 701-02. Furthermore, the parishioner could maintain a claim against the for-
mer rector for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the rector's breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. at 705. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to de-
termine whether, under neutral principles of law, a court could decide parishioner's allega-
tions against second clergyman without becoming entangled in religious doctrine. Id. at 698.
84. Many states have denied clergy malpractice claims. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that clergy malpractice
not allowed under Texas law because it would mean the courts evaluation of religious doc-
trine); see also Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (claims for
professional negligence equivalent to clergy malpractice and did not state a cause of action
under law).
85. Some have attempted to establish a workable standard of care that a religious or-
ganization owes to a member. See Constance Frisby Fain, Clergy Malpractice: Liability For
Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 97, 99-104 (1991). This ar-
ticle proposes a standard of care, discusses judicial responses to these types of claims, and
reviews how churches are responding to such claims. Id. at 99-102. Specifically, religious
organizations are implementing training programs and renovating organization policy in an
attempt to limit their liability. Id. at 118-22.
86. The term "bishop," as used here, is not meant to restrict the example to leaders of
the Catholic faith. Any member of any religious organization that has supervisory authority
and would be qualified to testify that a reasonable clergy member, in the same or similar
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judging the conduct of a religious organization is the judgment of the
doctrines and canons underlying that conduct.' Second, to avoid clergy
malpractice, courts primarily find other causes of action in which it may
still consider religious doctrine, but not excessively so.' Finally, courts
have voiced their worry that this theory of recovery would cause the
court to go down a "slippery slope" involving difficult and unconstitu-
tional questions of liability.89
B. Respondeat Superior
Another common theory of recovery plaintiffs attempt in these
claims is respondeat superior, which focuses on an employer's vicarious
liability for the acts of its employees that are within the scope of their
employment.' Wisconsin, like many other states, does not recognize
this as a viable theory of recovery against religious organizations.9 The
counseling position would not permit a sexual relationship between a clergy member and a
organization member.
87. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995). The
Pritzlaff court found that this theory would create a "reasonable bishop" norm that would
necessarily require some inquiry into church doctrine. Id at 790. This may encourage a
challenger to attack a religious organization's beliefs in such concepts as penance, admoni-
tion, and reconciliation when arguing the reasonableness of the church's actions toward the
offending clergy. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 47. An example of this is Roman
Catholic Canon law that forbids a bishop from dismissing a priest who commits child sexual
abuse if, at the time of the incident, the priest was physically or psychologically impaired.
1983 Code c. 1324, §§ 1-3. A court or jury will then have to evaluate the "reasonableness" of
this church law.
88. See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ohio 1991). The court found that clergy
malpractice "does not address any aspect of the clergy-communicant relationship not already
actionable." Id. The court did not want the claimant to recover several times for the same
injury. ld. at 586.
89. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
90. Shannon v. City of Milwaukee, 289 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Wis. 1980); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1) (1957) (An employer can be held vicariously
liable for its employee's negligent acts while the employee is acting within the scope of his or
her employment.).
91. Wisconsin law requires that even in a secular atmosphere, in respondeat superior it
is difficult to prove that a counselor's sexual exploitation of a patient is in the scope of the
counselor's employment. See Block v. Gomez, 549 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
Other states have found that in a religious setting, a clergy's sexual exploitation of a pa-
rishioner is not within a clergy member's scope of employment. See Destefano v. Grabrian,
763 P.2d 275,286-87 (Colo. 1988) (finding that there was no basis to impute vicarious liability
to a diocese for a priest's conduct because the conduct was contrary to the church's princi-
ples); see also Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. Ct  App. 1997) (holding that conten-
tions that pastor and bishop breached duties as fiduciaries were not actionable and that plain-
tiff could not establish the church defendants' liability under a respondeat superior theory);
Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (While the First Amendment
did not bar respondeat superior claims, a court must still determine whether the "minister
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key problem with this theory is that plaintiffs must prove that the
clergy's acts were within the scope of their employment with the relig-
ious organization.92 Because sexual misconduct is rarely, if ever, within
the scope of a clergy member's employment, this theory of recovery
fails to state a viable claim of action.9
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiffs have also claimed that a fiduciary relationship existed be-
tween a member of the clergy, a religious organization, and a member
of the religious organization, and that breach of this fiduciary duty
caused the plaintiff's injuries. 9 In other words, the religious organiza-
tion had a fiduciary duty and owed the plaintiff for his or her injuries.
Courts have distinguished this nonprofessional standard of care from
the one relating to clergy malpractice.95 Laws relating to this claim vary
from state to state, but the determinative factor in this claim is whether
the state laws require that a property interest exist between the relig-
ious organization and the plaintiff.96 While this theory appears more
was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the tort occurred.").
92. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 789 (Wis. 1995) cert
denied 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996); L.N.N. v. Clauder, 522 N.W.2d 879, 886 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996);
see also Ward, supra note 16, at 24. In these cases, the courts found that sex was clearly not
part of the clergy member's position, therefore, outside the scope of employment and not
subject to claims of respondeat superior. See also Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 245-46
(Mo. 1997); Byrd v. Faber 565 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ohio 1991); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d
450, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Other challenges have been made as to whether the clergy is
actually "employed" by the diocese under the rules of law. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of
Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 331-33 (Colo. 1993) (Rovira, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part.). But cf DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
This approach to respondeat superior considers whether the alleged conduct arose within the
time and space limits of the employment and whether the employee may at least be partially
motivated to serve the employer. Id. at 230. Under these circumstances, this approach al-
lows for recovery under respondeat superior.
93. Some have not given up their attempt to revive the theory of respondeat superior as
a viable theory of recovery for plaintiffs in such cases. See, e.g., Wilbourn, supra note 56, at
270.
94. Moses, 863 P.2d at 321.
95. The main difference between the two causes of action is that clergy malpractice re-
quires a professional standard of care, while a fiduciary duty does not. Id; see also Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (delineating the difference between
clergy malpractice and fiduciary duty standards of care).
96. Some courts require a property interest among their elements of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 321. The court here relies on the definition that, "a fiduci-
ary relation exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give
advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation." Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt.a (1979)). This somewhat looser interpreta-
tion found that a clergy-parishioner relationship is not always a fiduciary relationship, but
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plausible than clergy malpractice because there is no professional stan-
dard of care, it still requires a court or jury to establish a standard of
care that may require excessive interpretation of religious doctrine.'
Although this standard may be less involved in religious doctrine than
ones discussed thus far,98 this Comment suggests that in these situations,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and future plaintiffs, should rely on the
least intrusive theory of negligent supervision that does not violate the
federal or state constitutions.
D. Negligent Hiring and Retention
One of the most common theories of recovery is negligent hiring
and retention." For negligent hiring or retention, a plaintiff usually
must establish that a governing religious body was negligent in hiring or
retaining a clergy member because he or she was otherwise unfit.1" The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that such a claim "requires interpre-
tation of church canons and internal church policies and practices."''
Other states have allowed such a claim because their courts believe re-
view of negligent hiring and retention does not require inquiry into re-
ligious practice or doctrine.' Apparently, whether a court allows a
can be a question for the jury. Id. at 322
97. This line of argument suggests that because the duty is not professional, liability for
breach of the employer's duty can be determined by secular principles, therefore avoiding an
"reasonable archbishop" norm. Instinctively, when any jury has to establish a duty of care
for one clergy member to another, it seems impossible not to cross into interpretation of re-
ligious laws. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 44.
98. This is not to say that the duty on a religious organization would not be high. See
Jennifer L. Wallace, Comment, Tort Law-Fiduciary Theory Imposes Higher Duty and Di-
rect Liability on Church For Clergy Sexual Misconduct-Tenetry v. Diocese of Colorado, 863
P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994) (The fiduciary theory of re-
covery imposes a higher duty of care on the church and holds it directly liable to its parish-
ioners.).
99. Negligent hiring and retention, while may be treated as different torts, will be
treated as one claim in this Comment because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has treated it as
one claim. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This court stated
that "review only requires the court to determine if the Church Defendants knew of Hen-
son's inappropriate conduct." Id. at 456. This court, however, coupled negligent hiring with
negligent supervision. Id. at 454-56. This Comment will argue that while one claim may be
reasonable, the other is excessively entangled with the Constitution. Cf. Moses v. Diocese of
Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 328 (Colo. 1993) (The court found that the Diocese had a duty to
exercise reasonable care in hiring and that the Diocese should have anticipated the degree of
contact with other persons the hired would have had when deciding on whether to hire.).
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claim for negligent hiring and retention depends on whether a court be-
lieves that the religious organizations actions are separable from their
religious doctrine.' Arguably, this kind of inquiry into the hiring and
retention decisions of a religious institution will intrude upon religious
rules and beliefs because a court would necessarily have to consider re-
ligious doctrine when reviewing hiring or firing decisions.'O4 Therefore,
to avoid inevitable entanglement of religious and secular laws, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has also disapproved of this theory in Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee.05
E. Negligent Supervision
Negligent supervision is defined as liability arising from a person's
negligence or recklessness in the supervision of activity of his or her
servants or other agents." Liability under negligent supervision occurs
103. It appears that whether a claim requires a state to interpret religious doctrine de-
pends on the state. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Moses v. Diocese of Colo-
rado, 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993), found that the plaintiff's claim of negligent hiring was
permissible because it "do[es] not involve disputes within the church and are not based solely
on ecclesiastical or disciplinary matters which would call into question the trial court's power
to render a judgment against the defendants. Our decision does not require a reading of the
Constitution or Canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church." Id. Conversely, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Pritzlaff found that a similar claim of negligent supervision was barred
because "the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the courts of this
state from determining what makes one ... require interpretation of church canons and in-
ternal church policies and practices." Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d
780,790 (Wis. 1995). See also Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (A priest's
ordination is a quintessentially religious matter, "whose resolution the First Amendment
commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church.")
(citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Millivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)). Curiously,
the court in Gibson relied on Agostini v. Felton, a Supreme Court case dealing with whether
teachers from secular schools could teach special programs at parochial schools. See
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (cited with approval in Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248).
104. For example, "Roman Catholic canon law does not permit the bishop to summarily
dismiss the priest who admits child sexual abuse if the priest was psychologically or physi-
cally impaired at the time of the abuse incident." See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 7, at 48
(quoting 1983 Code c. 1324, §§ 1-3). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that, "[f]reedom to select the clergy.., must now be said to have federal constitutional pro-
tection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
105. 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995); see also infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
106. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Wis. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1957)). Wisconsin still has yet to formally recognize that a
claim for negligent supervision exists. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has twice assumed,
without deciding, that such a cause of action exists in Wisconsin. See L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at
445; Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 789. Apparently this question will be answered in Miller v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 1997 WL 106240 (Wis. App. 1997), cerL granted, 568 N.W.2d 302 (Wis.
1997).
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only if the employer "knew or should have known that its employee
would subject a third party to an unreasonable risk of harm."' ' Thus a
court must first ask if the religious organization had rights of supervi-
sion over the actual wrongdoer (the agency question). If the answer to
this question is yes, the questions are then whether the supervisor owed
the plaintiff a duty to properly supervise the actual wrongdoer and
whether the supervisor breached that duty (the tort question). Whether
a plaintiff's claim originally is based on tortlos or agency's° theories de-
107. L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 445 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213
cmt.d. (1957)). The Restatement further explains:
Liability results under the rule stated in this Section ... because the employer ante-
cedently had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of
the employment. The employer is subject to liability only for such harm as is within
the risk. If, therefore, the risk exists because of the quality of the employee, there is
liability only to the extent that the harm is caused by the quality of the employee
which the employer had reason to suppose would be likely to cause harm.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965), regarding negligent supervision,
states in relevant part:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while
acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally
harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the ser-
vant is privileged to enter only as his servant.... and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his ser-
vant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control.
Id. Thus this standard limits situations of sexual misconduct in which a court can hold a re-
ligious organization liable to only the situations in which the religious organization could
possibly control sexual misconduct by its clergy.
Many states have adopted this RESTATEMENT rule. See, e.g., Nasser v. Parker, 455
S.E.2d 502, 504 (Va. 1995); Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Indep. Refinery, 879 P.2d 538, 540,
549-551 (Haw. 1994); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 328 (Colo. 1993); Mosko
v. Raytheon Co., 622 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Mass. 1993); Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus,
420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. 1992); Retherford v. AT&T Comm., 844 P.2d 949, 973 (Utah 1992);
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1957), regarding negligent supervi-
sion, states:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to li-
ability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper regula-
tions; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work in-
volving risk of harm to others:
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pends upon what the plaintiff originally pleads."'
Under an Establishment Clause analysis, some courts have not al-
lowed claims for negligent supervision because the court has held the
claim is excessively entangled with religious organizations, in violation
of the First Amendment. Others have found that negligent supervision
claims are allowable because a court can analyze the claim under
"neutral principles" of law."' This Comment contends that the two-
question analysis described above is a "neutral principle" of law that
does not require interpretation of religious doctrines and thus does not
excessively entangle the court in religious doctrine. First, while the
question of whether the defendant religious organization had the right
to supervise falls on a cases-by-case analysis, a court can determine this
question without interpreting religious doctrine simply; a court can
analyze the relationship between the supervisor and the clergy member
and apply "neutral principles" of law."' Furthermore, courts can also
(c) in supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by
persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instru-
mentalities under his control.
Id. This may be a more lenient standard than the definition of negligent supervision based in
tort theory. However, negligent supervision claims inherently require questions that involve
both tort and agency theory, and it is up to the court adopting the definition to choose the
definition it finds does not violate state or federal constitutions.
110. See, e.g., L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (in which a plain-
tiff's cause of action lied in agency, and plaintiff and priest had entered into a consensual re-
lationship). But cf. Niemann v. Cooley, 637 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (in which child
sexual abuse occurs law of tort applies). A claim of negligent supervision under the Re-
statement of Agency "is a special application of the general rules stated in the Restatement
of Torts." L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 445 n.21 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
213 cmt.a. (1957)).
111. See Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988) (No action could be
maintained against the minister); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
But see Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (holding a negligent super-
vision claim against a Diocese did not violate the Establishment Clause); Destefano v. Gra-
brian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (holding that no First Amendment protection
exists when claims are not rooted in religious belief).
112. The First Amendment only prohibits a court from determining underlying ques-
tions of religious doctrine and practice. See Presbyterian Church in the U. S. v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). Furthermore, the
"principle of neutrality embodied in the Establishment Clause does not prevent government
from enforcing its most fundamental constitutional and societal values by means of uniform
policy, neutrally applied." Bob Jones Univ. v. Blumenthal, 639 F.2d 147, 154 (4th Cir. 1980).
The court in Bob Jones went on to state "[w]e agree that Government must maintain an atti-
tude of neutrality toward all religions. But certain governmental interests are so compelling
that conflicting religious practices must yield in their favor." Id. (citations omitted).
1998] BLANKET IMMUNITY FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 633
apply "neutral principles" of law to determine "duty" and "breach"."'
A court can analyze the supervisory interests that are a concern here
secularly, without having to interpret or cast judgment on any religious
doctrine, thus not excessively entangling the court in religious doctrine.
Clearly, there exists a fine line that a court must be careful not to cross.
If the supervisory interest involves religious doctrine, a court cannot
allow a claim of negligent supervision. However, if the facts dictate that
the supervisory interest is secular in nature, then a court may allow a
claim of negligent supervision against a religious organization. For ex-
ample, if a priest was assigned to teach softball, and a diocese knew or
should have known of the priest's sexually predatory history, they
should be subject to a claim of negligent supervision. Arguably, the na-
ture of the supervision, which here is clearly secular in nature, would
dictate whether a court could allow the claim.
This Comment also contends that negligent supervision claims also
do not conflict with a Free Exercise Clause review. First, Wisconsin has
a compelling state interest in this area. Encouraging religious organiza-
tions to end a clergy member's cycle of repeated sexual misconduct is
undoubtedly a compelling state interest.1 State statutes protecting
children and adults from sexual misconduct reflect this idea.""
Second, allowing claims for negligent supervision is the least intru-
sive means the state can use to enforce this compelling state interest.
All the theories previously discussed will excessively entangle a court
into an analysis of a religious organization's doctrinal beliefs. For ex-
ample, respondeat superior fails because sexual misconduct by a mem-
ber of the clergy is rarely, if ever, part of the scope of the clergy mem-
ber's employment under the religious organization."6  Clergy
113. This is exactly what the Colorado Supreme Court did in Moses, 863 P.2d at 327-28
(in which it analyzed negligent hiring and supervision of an errant clergy member).
The court could further ensure the rights of the Diocese by adopting the analysis in
Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.
1985). In assessing whether a statute challenged under the First Amendment Establishment
Clause fostered excessive entanglement between religion and government, the court consid-
ered the character of the institution affected, the type of burden placed on that institution,
and the resulting church-state relationship. Id. at 945.
114. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (The government's interest in
preventing trusted authority figures from sexually abusing children is certainly a compelling
state interest.).
115. Although Wisconsin has not enacted a statute dealing with this issue specifically, it
has enacted a statute to create a civil cause of action for acts constituting a therapist's sexual
exploitation. See WIs. STAT. § 895.70 (1996). This cause of action is most like situations in
which a plaintiff sues a priest who was acting as a counselor.
116. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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malpractice and fiduciary duty claims require a court to determine a
reasonable standard of care for a religious organization, and a court can
easily substitute these claims with the less intrusive "reasonableness"
standard in a negligent supervision claim."7 Similarly, a claim of negli-
gent hiring and retention is also far too intrusive because it requires a
court to determine the decision making policies imbedded in the canons
of a religious organization."8
Negligent supervision is a claim that is the least intrusive of these
claims, and it eliminates the need for other causes of action. Under this
theory, a church's liability would arise only when a church knew or
should have known about the misconduct and allowed it to continue.11 9
This theory allows a church the religious freedom to hire and retain
whomever it wants. The only requirement this theory imposes is that
when a religious organization knows or should know of clergy miscon-
duct, it removes the priest from a position in which sexual misconduct
may happen again. The "reasonableness" of the religious hierarchy's
behavior, while still subject to a court and jury, is the least intrusive of
all the claims and can be limited to decisions that are secular in na-
ture.1o A religious organization should be held accountable and not be
117. See supra notes 80-88, 94-98 and accompanying text. Other states have found that
not allowing negligent supervision claims is not an establishment of religion, and therefore
does not conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239,
247 (Mo. 1997) ("Not recognizing the cause of negligent failure to supervise clergy is not an
establishment of religion because it is a 'nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption."')
(quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876, 879 (1990)). The court in Gibson al-
lowed a claim for "intentional failure to supervise." Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248. Specifically,
[a] cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy is stated if (1) a super-
visor (or supervisors) exists; (2) the supervisor (or supervisors) knew that harm was
certain or substantially certain to result; (3) the supervisor (or supervisors) disre-
garded this known risk; (4) the supervisor's inaction caused damage; and (5) the
other requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 317 are met. This
cause of action requires a supervisor. The First Amendment does not, however,
allow a court to decide issues of church government-whether or not a cleric should
have a supervisor.
Id. Thus, while it appears at first glance that this may be an less constitutionally-
problematic alternative to negligent supervision claims, the determination of who is or is not
a supervisor may give rise to the same kinds of constitutional hurdles that a negligent super-
vision claim does.
118. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
119. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 445 (Wis. 1997).
120. The belief that negligent supervision is the least intrusive means for a court to re-
view a claim against a religious organization falls on a case-by-case analysis based on the
tenets of the religious doctrine. For example, supervision may be the least intrusive form of
governmental involvement under the Catholic faith, but not under Jewish faith. However,
many courts have found that negligent supervision claims do not require interpretation of
religious doctrine, and thus the review of religious doctrines and canons may be unnecessary.
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able to hide behind a blanket of immunity by simply stating that their
supervision decision, no matter how secular in nature, involves religious
doctrine. Thus, the law would break the vicious circle of abuse a relig-
ious organization creates when it routinely transfers a clergy member to
a new and similar situation for his sexual misconduct will be broken,
and Wisconsin courts would impose the least amount of intrusion into
the religious organization's doctrinal beliefs. Hence, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court should have allowed this cause of action because it best
serves the interests of both the State of Wisconsin and its religious or-
ganizations.
IV. REVIEW OF WISCONSIN CASE LAW
Wisconsin case law on this topic is scarce. However, Wisconsin does
have a few cases that fall within the realm of this issue. This section
provides an overview of Wisconsin case law that developed the level of
constitutional review, discusses Wisconsin case law, and sets forth de-
tailed descriptions of Pritzlaff and L.L.N..
A. General Constitutional Review
The first significant Wisconsin case to involve the traditional federal
level of constitutional review is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1 which reached
the United States Supreme Court. In Yoder, the Supreme Court held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state from
compelling Amish parents to make their children, who had already
graduated the eighth grade, attend a formal high school until they were
sixteen.m The conflict here involved Wisconsin state statutes compel-
ling children to attend school until they were sixteen, and an Amish re-
ligious claim that children should not attend formal schooling after the
eighth grade.12 The Supreme Court used the compelling state inter-
est/least restrictive means test first presented in Sherbert v. Verner 24 to
hold that the state statutes violated the Amish's claims for free exercise
of religion.w
See, e.g., Doe v. Redeemer Lutheran Church, 531 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Moses
v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
121. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
122. Id. at 234.
123. Id. at 215.
124. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
125. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
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In Olston v. Hallock,2 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found, under
the Constitution, it could not review a religious organization's decision
to terminate a minister."' They found an Episcopal diocese decision to
discharge a priest because of "differences" between the congregation
and the priest was "outside the province of judicial review, and that
such review would be unconstitutional.'2 Another, more recent case is
Black v. St. Bernadette Congregation.'29 In Black, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals was unwilling to decide matters of internal church govern-
ment. The court held that these religious doctrines were at the heart of
the church's infrastructure, and therefore outside the scope of judicial
review."'
In State v. Miller"' the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the
Wisconsin State Constitution affords religious organizations greater
protection than the federal Constitution. The court held that requiring
members of an Amish religious organization to display the slow-moving
vehicle emblem on their buggies violated their Wisconsin State Consti-
tutional right to freedom of conscience.3 2 The free exercise claim in
Miller is fundamental to the issue here because the Wisconsin Supreme
court clarified that the "Wisconsin Constitution ... provides stronger
protection of religious freedom than that envisioned in the federal con-
stitution.""' The court achieved this stronger protection by applying the
compelling interest/least restrictive alternative analysis." Thus, despite
whether the United States Supreme Court keeps the lower "neutral
laws of general applicability" standard of Smith or adopts the height-
ened standard of constitutional review, Miller dictates that when Wis-
consin state courts review free exercise claims, they must, under the
state constitution, follow the compelling interest/least restrictive alter-
126. 201 N.W.2d 35 (Wis. 1972).
127. Id at 40.
128. Id. at 40-41.
129. 360 N.W.2d 550,553 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
130. Ia
131. 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
132. Id at 237.
133. Id. The court went even further to state that:
[Fjreedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is not con-
strained by the boundaries of protection the United States Supreme Court has set
for the federal provision. We hold that our state constitution provides an inde-
pendent basis on which to decide this case.
I
134. While the Wisconsin State Constitution protection is "stronger" than what RFRA
offered, Wisconsin applies the same test as RFRA to assure religious organization's rights
when evaluating free exercise claims. ld at 240.
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native analysis for freedom of conscience claims against religious or-
ganizations.
B. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee
The Wisconsin Supreme Court examined an Archdiocese free exer-
cise defense in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee."s In Pritzlaff, the
Plaintiff sued a Catholic priest, claiming that he had used his position in
the clergy to force her into a relationship many years earlier. She also
claimed the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring, retaining, and super-
vising the Priest, as the Archdiocese knew or should have known of the
Priest's conduct.Y6 The Archdiocese raised the Free Exercise Clause as
its defense.
Pritzlaff is interesting for several reasons. First, in its analysis the
court found that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim.L"
Therefore, the court had no duty to decide such an important, constitu-
tional issue, namely whether the Archdiocese was accountable under
negligent hiring and supervision for the acts of its clergy.3 8 The court
did, however, go on to decide these issues. The court concluded that
even if the statute of limitations did not bar the plaintiff's claim,
Pritzlaff would still fail to state a claim against the Archdiocese for
which a court could grant relief.139 The court first noted that it has still
not determined whether such a cause of action (negligent hiring and re-
tention, or supervision) exists in Wisconsin. The court then states "we
assume, but do not decide, that [such a claim] does [exist]," but then
proceeds to examine the elements of each claim.'
14
This raises a second interesting facet of Pritzlaff. In a brief discus-
135. 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).
136. Id. at 782-83.
137. Id. at 789.
138. Id. at 794 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting). Justice Abrahamson's candid dissent
clearly explains why the decision regarding negligent hiring, retention, and supervision was
unnecessary.
The court refuses to decide a straightforward issue of state tort law, that is whether the
state recognizes a tort of negligence in hiring, retaining, training or supervising employees.
But the majority eagerly reaches out to decide a federal constitutional issue. The majority
holds that if such a tort existed in this state, it would be barred in this case by the First
Amendment.
Id. Justice Abrahamson further cites the basic rule dictating that "[a] court should not con-
sider constitutional issues unless such a decision is essential to the determination of the ques-
tion before the court." Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton, 356 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Wis. 1984)).
139. See Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 789.
140. Id. at 790.
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sion of negligent hiring and retention, 4' the court noted that
"determining what makes one competent to serve as a Catholic
priest... would require interpretation of church canons and internal
church policies and practices," and that the First Amendment thus pre-
vented it.'42 The court then went on to hold that "state inquiry into the
training and supervision of clergy is a closer issue.., because under
some limited circumstances such questions might be able to be decided
without determining questions of church law and policies, the First
Amendment nonetheless prohibits it under most if not all circum-
stances.' 4  So the supreme court assumed, without deciding, that there
may be a cause of action for negligent supervision, but that the First
Amendment probably does not allow such inquiry.M This language
provides the exception the Wisconsin Court of Appeals then uses in
L.L.N. to allow L.L.N.'s claim of negligent supervision.
Finally, what is interesting in Pritzlaff is what the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court does not say. The court, in its analysis of the constitution-
ality of a claim for negligent supervision, does not apply the free exer-
cise (compelling state interest/least restrictive means) analysis, much
less the "neutral laws of general applicability" standard from Smith. In-
stead, it did an end-run analysis that went straight to discussion of the
"chilling effect" such a claim would have on ecclesiastical authorities,'45
and a "scope of employment [analysis]" that a claim for negligent su-
pervision does not require. 4' While Pritzlaff is the case most religious
organizations hold up in their defense, it arguably could have opened
the door to negligent supervision claims.' 7
141. The court in Pritzlaff treats this claim, as does this Comment, as one claim. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 791.
144. One can understand Justices Abrahamson's opinion that the "court refuses to de-
cide a straightforward issue of state tort law[.]" Id. at 794 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The
issue of whether Wisconsin recognizes the tort of negligent supervision should be decided in
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1997 WL 106240 (Wis. App. 1997), cert. granted, 568 N.W.2d
302 (Wis. 1997).
145. While employers may not have a duty to supervise off-duty employees, clearly a
court can determine this on a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 791 (citing Tichenor v. Roman
Catholic Church of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 960 (5th Cir. 1994)).
146. Id. at 791. The Wisconsin Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that a claim
for negligent supervision exists, and it followed the definition provided in the RE-
STATEMENT. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434,443 (Wis. 1997). The rule dictates that
the servant be acting outside the scope of his employment. Id.
147. Specifically, the language that later courts have relied on to argue that Pritzlaff
opens a door is the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reference to negligent supervision being "a
closer issue" and "because under some limited circumstances such questions might be able to
be decided without determining questions of church law and policies." Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d
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C. Analogous Cases
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the Free Exercise Clause
analysis in Jocz v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Rela-
tions"' and was unwilling to entangle itself in church doctrine regarding
an employment setting. The plaintiff in Jocz was a female employee of
a seminary who filed a complaint with the Department of Industry, La-
bor, and Human Relations, claiming the seminary discriminated against
her because of her sex.'49 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Jocz
found that if a court finds that an employment position at issue was
purely "ministerial" or "ecclesiastical" by definition,'o the Federal and
State Constitution's religious protection clauses prevented the state
from enforcing its employment discrimination law.'5' Jocz was the first
case to interpret and apply the ruling in Pritzlaffs2 The court in Jocz
encouraged the argument that a court will no longer allow a religious
organization to challenge civil laws in which purely secular conduct is
concerned." Arguably, religious organizations can now be held ac-
countable in Wisconsin, at least regarding its secular activity.
Block v. Gomez occurred in a secular setting, but still is relevant be-
cause it involved a clinic's liability for actions of its counselor.' -" In
Block, a patient who had a sexual relationship with her counselor
brought an action against the counselor and the drug clinic. The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals found that the counselor's actions were outside
the scope of his employment; therefore, a claim of respondeat superior
against the clinic failed."" This case emphasizes the court's reluctance
to apply the theory of respondeat superior, even in a secular setting.
With the heightened standard of review used for cases involving relig-
ious organizations, this theory will undoubtedly always fail.
at 791; see also L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879,885 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
148. 538 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
149. Id. at 590-91.
150. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
151. See Jocz, 538 N.W.2d at 597.
152. See Ward, supra note 16, at 28 n.2 ("[P]laintiffs in Wisconsin have begun to attack
and distinguish the First Amendment holding [in Pritzlafj], especially through the use of
Jocz .... ).
153. See Jocz, 538 N.W.2d at 597.
154. 549 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
155. Id. at 787-88.
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D. L.L.N. v. Clauder, Wisconsin Court of Appeals
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in L.L.N. v. Clauder,'56 used the
free exercise language from Pritzlaff regarding negligent supervision
and held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment did not
bar a negligent supervision claim against a diocese."" In L.L.N., the
plaintiff while a patient at a hospital, entered into a sexual relationship
with a priest who was counseling at the hospital.'58 She brought a claim
against the Diocese for negligent supervision.159 Interestingly, for its de-
fense, the Diocese used the Pritzlaff decision, claiming that Pritzlaff
held that the First Amendment prohibits a claim for negligent supervi-
sion involving a religious organization."6 The court in L.L.N., however,
found that Pritzlaff did not preclude a claim for negligent supervision,
stating that L.L.N.'s claim was one of the "limited circumstances" in
which a court could allow a negligent supervision claim without intrud-
ing into church policy. 6' The plaintiff in L.L.N. based her negligent su-
pervision claim on the priest's actions as a counselor and not on his
priestly duties.62 Thus, the court found it easier to separate these duties
from the rules of the church.'63
While the court in L.L.N. tried to open the door for claims under
negligent supervision against religious organizations as articulated in
Pritzlaff, the constitutional level of review the court used should be ex-
amined under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses be-
cause of the courts' unpredictable analysis of these claims. While the
court analyzed this case under the Establishment Clause, Wisconsin
156. 552 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
157. Id at 887.
158. The facts of L.L.N. are more clearly defined later in this text. See infra notes 182-
89 and accompanying text.
159. Plaintiff also brought an action against the diocese for respondeat superior, but the
court found that the priest's actions were outside the scope of his employment. See L.L.N.,
552 N.W.2d at 888.
160. Id. at 885.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 886. "To resolve L.L.N.'s claim, a factfinder need not interpret or weigh
church doctrine but merely determine, under neutral rules of law, whether, under the facts, a
reasonable person would know or should have known that Clauder's placement as hospital
chaplain was likely to result in harm." Id. This Comment argues that while separating the
clergy's duties as a counselor may make the court's decision easier, it is unnecessary under
the analysis proposed here. This analysis assumes any decision a religious organization
makes regarding its clergy necessarily intrudes upon the organization's doctrines, and a court
must choose the least intrusive theory of recovery to not violate the state or federal constitu-
tions.
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courts, in the past, have analyzed these claims under the Free Exercise
Clause.'" Therefore, this Comment will analyze L.L.N.'s claim under
both levels of constitutional review.
Regarding the Establishment Clause, the court found that a court
must "determine, under neutral rules of law, whether, under the facts, a
reasonable person would know or should have known that Clauder's
placement as hospital chaplain was likely to result in harm."'" In
L.L.N., the court held that the sexual relationship between the priest
and the woman had no grounding in Catholic doctrine or faith, and that
in resolving the claim, the fact finder would not have to interpret or
weigh church doctrine.1" Therefore, there was no entanglement issue
regarding the Establishment Clause, and the court could review the
claim.
The court in L.L.N. did not analyze a defense for the Diocese under
the Free Exercise Clause, but this analysis is revealing as well.'67 Inter-
estingly, five days before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided
L.L.N, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Miller.'" Miller raised
the constitutional level of review for cases involving religious organiza-
tions, 69 thus granting the defendant/Diocese in L.L.N. greater protec-
tion, at least regarding free exercise claims. Arguably, the L.L.N. court
should have held that the Diocese was entitled to the heightened consti-
tutional level of review afforded by Miller.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court could have found that L.L.N.'s claim
for negligent supervision existed even under the Free Exercise Clause
analysis, although the Diocese's decisions are "ministerial" and require
the heightened standard of a compelling state interest/least restrictive
alternative analysis.7 Under this standard, the Wisconsin Supreme
164. As stated, religious organizations generally raise the Free Exercise Clause as a de-
fense, and a plaintiff or court finds those privileges are too broad. A plaintiff or court then
answers this claim by raising the Establishment Clause, and saying the broad privileges are
an establishment of religion. What analysis one sees in an opinion may be a function of
where the case is in the trial process. For example, the court in L.L.N. may have been ana-
lyzing the claim under the Establishment Clause because the judge at the trial court level al-
ready decided that a grant of free exercise would result in an establishment of religion. Id-
165. Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 883-85.
167. Usually religious organizations raise both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clauses as their defenses. The supreme court may wish to address the free exercise
defense in the future.
168. State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
169. Id. at 240.
170. It is unclear whether the defendant in L.L.N. pleaded the defense used in Miller,
that the claim violated their rights of conscience under Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin
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Court should have applied the four-part test outlined in Miller.' Under
the Miller four-part test, the Diocese would first have to prove that it
has a sincerely held religious belief. 1 2 Clearly, for an established Dio-
cese, the Diocese could easily satisfy this burden.
Second, the Diocese must prove that the application of the state law
burdens its religious beliefs. 4 For purposes of this argument, this
Comment will assume that the Diocese knew liability for negligent su-
pervision claims is a burden on its religious doctrine.'75 Logically, a legal
system will burden a religious organization that now has to reevaluate
how to supervise its clergy.
The third part of the test shifts the burden to the state to prove that
the law is based on a compelling state interest.Y7 7 As stated, the state
will probably establish this using state statutes" as evidence of its
strong interest in eliminating repeated sexual assault to adults and mi-
Constitution. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 237.
171. Id. at 240.
172 Id This gives rise to the issue of what is a sincerely held religious belief, and what
standards does a judiciary use to determine this? The Supreme Court has attempted to an-
swer this question in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970). The Supreme Court attempted to define the term "religious training
and belief" within meaning of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which ex-
empts from training those who oppose to participation in war because of their religion. See
50 U.S.C. App. § 456 6) (1990). For example, the Supreme Court said the test might be "[a]
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the
statutory definition." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. Of course, this would only define religion
within this particular federal statute. This issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
173. For example, in Miller, the defendants were members of the Old Order Amish.
The court found that their horse drawn buggy was an "expression of their religious beliefs."
549 N.W.2d at 241.
174. 1&
175. This is a logical assumption because religious supervision decisions will then have
to factor in possible civic consequences. Moreover, any civil liability will impose monetary
obligations on the Diocese.
176. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 241.
177. Wisconsin law allows civil claims for a therapist's sexual exploitation. See WIS.
STAT. § 895.70 (1996). Interestingly, this statute's definition of "therapist" includes "a physi-
cian, psychologist, social worker, marriage and family therapist, professional counselor,
nurse, chemical dependency counselor, member of the clergy or other person, whether or not
licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to performs psychotherapy." §
895.70(e) (emphasis added).
Wisconsin also has many criminal statutes prohibiting sexual misconduct against adult
and children. For example, Wisconsin has a criminal statute that if an organization knows a
therapist is committing sexual exploitation, it has a duty to report. See WIS. STAT. § 940.22
(1997); see also WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (1997) (sexual assault of an adult); WIS. STAT. § 948.02
(1997) (sexual assault of a child).
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nors.
Finally, the state must prove that a less restrictive alternative cannot
serve this compelling state interest.7 In such a case, the state must ar-
gue that negligent supervision is the least intrusive means of ending a
priest's cycle of sexual misconduct. By holding the Diocese responsible
for removing the priest from situations in which he may harm a parish-
ioner, the Diocese insures the state that the Diocese will not just trans-
fer the priest to a new parish. Liability for negligent supervision by the
Diocese will only be found if a jury finds that the Diocese failed to ex-
ercise reasonable care to control the priest from intentionally harming
L.L.N. and that the Priest acted outside the scope of his employment. 9
A court cannot decide the Diocese's decisions on hiring, retention, or
church policies. For these reasons, negligent supervision is the least in-
trusive means of enforcing the state's interest. Thus, under either a
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause analysis, negligent supervision
against a religious organization does not violate state or federal consti-
tutions, regardless of whether the claim is based in agency or tort theo-
ries.
E. L.L.N. v. Clauder, Wisconsin Supreme Court
The only issue the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in L.L.N. was
"whether the Diocese is entitled to summary judgment on L.L.N.'s
claim that it negligently supervised Clauder. '"'  The court reviewed the
relevant facts as follows. Clauder and L.L.N. began their relationship in
1988 while Clauder served as a chaplain at a hospital in Madison."1
Clauder and L.L.N. met through Father Hebl, who was a pastor at a
nearby church." Clauder initially met L.L.N. at the hospital to discuss
complications in her pregnancy, but they began seeing each other out-
side the hospital after L.L.N. suffered a miscarriage. Their affair began
in June of 1990 and lasted until May of 1991." After the relationship
ended, L.L.N. informed a Bishop of her sexual relations with Clauder.
Another Bishop asked Hebl if he had any knowledge of this tendency in
178. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d, at 240.
179. See Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317). While the court may impose a reasonable stan-
dard to an employer, this Comment assumes that the court would impose a reasonable stan-
dard of a Diocese, which requires the compelling state interest/least intrusive means test.
180. 563 N.W.2d 434,437 (Wis. 1997).
181. Id. at 437.
182. Id.
183. Id
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Clauder. Hebl then stated that several years ago he had observed Clau-
der and another woman in a strange incident. Specifically, "Hebl heard
Clauder yell for help from his private room in the rectory. When Hebl
entered Clauder's room, he found Clauder restraining a woman on the
floor by straddling her body and holding down her hands. Clauder was
bleeding from a bite on his wrist."'88 Hebl never reported this incident
to anyone until notifying the Bishop.'85
L.L.N. claimed that because of the incident Hebl witnessed, "the
Diocese knew or should have known that Clauder posed a risk of abus-
ing his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit patients whom
he counseled."'86  The Diocese claimed it was entitled to summary
judgment because: 1) The First Amendment barred L.L.N.'s claim for
negligent supervision, and 2) based on the facts, the Diocese did not
know, nor should it have known, of Clauder's sexual activity." Before
proceeding to the issue of negligent supervision, the court once again
avoided officially recognizing negligent supervision as a claim in Wis-
consin, instead "assum[ing] that such a claim exists, without deciding
the issue."'8
1. The Majority
The court held that the Diocese was entitled to summary judgment
for two reasons. First, the court held that the First Amendment pro-
184. IaL
185. Id. at 438. HebI, in his deposition, explained the incident as follows:
Q. Among other things, did it raise the question in your mind about whether there
were some sexual activities going on between Father Clauder and [this woman]?
A. Let me put this kind of spin on it... obviously she attacked him, it seemed that
way, and he was defending himself. You can put any interpretation you want on
that. I saw no visual signs, none whatsoever of any sexual attack or intimacy or be-
havior, none whatsoever. Now, a person out there could say, "Well, that must have
happened or could have happened." I did not put that spin on it.
Q. Was that a concern or suspicion that you had or did you dismiss that as not a re-
alistic possibility?
A. I never accused him ever of anything along this line, any of the priests. I just
don't, wouldn't think that's their behavior....
Q. Now, even though you didn't accuse [Clauder] of any sexual involvement with
[the woman], was that a thought that was in you mind as a possibility?
A. Oh, yeah, I think with the circumstances under which this happened, there could
be that possibility... but ... I would never, never accuse him of it ....
Id. at 437-38.
186. Id
187. Id. at 440.
188. Id. at 439 (citing Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Wis.
1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996)).
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hibited the negligent supervision claim. Furthermore, the court held
that even if the First Amendment did not bar L.L.N.'s negligent super-
vision claim, the facts of this case did not establish a genuine issue of
material fact.189
The court first analyzed the First Amendment issue under the Es-
tablishment Clause's entanglement doctrine."9 The court reviewed its
decision in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee9' and found that the
apparent opening for negligent supervision claims did not apply. The
court found that L.L.N.'s claim required that the Diocese knew or
should have known of Clauder's propensity for sexual activity would
require the court to interpret religious doctrine. The court reasoned
that Hebl had no position of authority over Clauder. The court also
reasoned that, to review Clauder's consensual sexual relationship with
an adult, "a court would be required to consider and interpret the vow
of celibacy in order to determine whether the Diocese negligently su-
pervised Clauder."' Thus the court held that to review L.L.N.'s claim,
it would have to review Clauder's vow of celibacy, this was clearly en-
tangled with church doctrine; therefore, the First Amendment pre-
cluded it.193
The court further held that even if the First Amendment did not
preclude L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision, "the undisputed facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [did] not establish a
genuine issue of material fact in regard to the element of notice."'' The
court used other jurisdictions to review the elements of a claim of negli-
gent supervision. It found that "an employer is liable for negligent su-
pervision only if it knew or should have known that its employee would
189. Id
190. Id at 440. The court correctly noted "that excessive governmental entanglement
with religion will occur if a court is required to interpret church law.... However, it is
equally well-settled that a court may hear an action if it will involve the consideration of neu-
tral principles of law." Id.
191. 533 N.W.2d at 780; see also supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
192. See L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 443-44. The court reasoned that:
[I]n order to hold the Diocese liable for breach of a duty of care to L.L.N., a court
would be required to determine that constructive knowledge of Clauder's involve-
ment with [the initial woman] should have triggered a different response by the
Diocese, because such involvement exposed a bad attribute of Clauder's character..
.Yet in order to make this determination, a court would be required to consider
the vow of celibacy, since sexual acts committed by single consenting adults are not
legally wrong, but instead become wrong only under church doctrine.
Id. at 444.
193. Id. at 445.
194. Id
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subject a third party to an unreasonable risk of harm." '195 The court held
that "it is illogical to conclude that Clauder was likely to abuse his posi-
tion as a chaplain to engage vulnerable patients in sexual intercourse."1"
Thus, there existed no genuine issue of material fact, and the court
granted the Diocese summary judgment.
2. The Dissent
The dissent felt that not only was there a genuine issue of material
fact, but that the majority wrongly and unnecessarily decided the First
Amendment issue. First, the dissent argued that there existed a genuine
issue of material fact."9 The dissent felt that there was a reasonable in-
ference that Clauder's behavior was not that of "consensual sexual rela-
tionship," but possibly one of "sexually assaultive behavior." '98 Fur-
thermore, it was negligent of the Diocese to keep Clauder in the
position of hospital chaplain considering the incident of which Hel was
aware, and that Clauder would be continually dealing with women who
may be vulnerable as a result of their hospitalization 99 The dissent
takes a more extensive look at the deposition material and concludes
there existed adverse facts on the record for which a jury should decide
whether it was reasonable that Hebl "knew or should of known that the
incident he witnessed between Clauder and [a previous woman] was
sexually assaultive in nature. "" Thus, according to the dissent, there
existed a genuine issue of material fact, and the Diocese should not
have been allowed its motion for summary judgment.
Second, the dissent argued that the majority unnecessarily decided
the First Amendment issue. One clear rule of Wisconsin courts is "as a
basic rule of judicial decision making, a court should not reach a consti-
tutional issue unless it is essential to the disposition of the case." 2"
195. Id
196. Id. at 446. The court went further to state, "[e]ven if the Diocese had constructive
knowledge of Clauder's sexual relationship with [the initial woman], this would not have put
the Diocese on notice" of Clauder's alleged propensity to abuse his position as chaplain to
engage patients in sexual intercourse. Id.
197. Id. at 448 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
198. Id
199. Id. at 448-49.
200. Id. at 450.
201. Id. (citing City of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 509 N.W.2d 730, 734 n.8 (Wis.
1994); Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 873, 882 (Wis. 1987); S.B. v. Racine County,
406 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Wis. 1987); Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 344 N.W.2d 177,
179 (Wis. 1984); Kollasch v. Adamany, 313 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Wis. 1981); State v. State Fair
Park, Inc., 124 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Wis. 1963); Witek v. State, 86 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Wis. 1957);
Smith v. Journal Co., 73 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Wis. 1955); State ex rel. Rosenhein v. Frear, 119
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Thus, if the majority felt the claim could be resolved by summary judg-
ment, there was no need to decide the constitutional issue.
Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority wrongly decided
the First Amendment issue. First, the dissent felt the First Amendment
issue was wrongly decided because Clauder's breach of the celibacy vow
"proves nothing of legal significance" and "adds nothing to L.L.N.'s
negligent supervision claim, [so] a court has no occasion to consider or
interpret the vow. The First Amendment is not implicated."m There-
fore, the majority was wrong to state that celibacy could not give a re-
ligious organization notice, yet it would be a "necessity" to inquire into
celibacy to bar a negligent supervision claim.'
The dissent further asserted that the First Amendment issue was
wrongly decided because religious organizations should be held ac-
countable for the negligent acts of their employees. "[C]ontrary to the
majority's conclusion, the Diocese may be charged with constructive
notice through Hebl regardless of whether he supervised Clauder.
Hebl's knowledge will be imputed to the Diocese so long as Hebl ob-
tained the knowledge in the course of his employment and within the
scope of his authority."2m Specifically, a jury could determine if an em-
ployer-employee relationship existed between the Diocese and Hebl
under "neutral rules of agency." 25
The dissent also realized this theory of recovery may be the only one
to pass First Amendment scrutiny, and that otherwise, religious organi-
zations are immune from tort liability.m In recognizing the broad im-
plications of the majority's ruling, the dissent noted that this decision
will also bar negligent supervision claims against religious organizations
that ignore or hide the actions of priests who sexually molest children.2
N.W. 894, 896 (Wis. 1909)). Arguably, the court does this to prudently settle both the consti-
tutional issue and the plaintiff's claim. This leaves no open question and significantly reduces
the chances the Supreme Court will review the case.
202. L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 451 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (quoting Majority op. at 446).
204. Id. at 452 (quoting Ivers & Pond Piano Co. v. Peckman, 139 N.W.2d 57, 59 (1966);
3 CJ.S. Agency § 432 (1973)).
205. Id.
206. Id Specifically, negligent supervision is "perhaps the only means of imposing tort
liability on a church or similar institution. If courts were not permitted to determine the le-
gal relationship between religious organizations and their clerics, religious organizations
would be effectively immunized from tort liability." Id.
207. Itt at 453.
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V. EVALUATION AND PROPOSAL
This Comment asserts that the Dissent correctly reasoned the issues
in L.L.N. by noting that the majority's unnecessary, erroneous, and
overreaching decision will have a extremely adverse effect on victims of
a clergy member's sexual abuse and that it gives blanket immunity to
religious organizations. First, as the dissent clearly stated, the major-
ity's decision of the First Amendment issue was unnecessary because
the court had already granted the Diocese summary judgment. One
fundamental rule of judicial decision-making is not to decide constitu-
tional issues if the case can be disposed of on other grounds." Appar-
ently, as Pritzlaff reflects, some members of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court are comfortable violating this rule of judicial decision-making in
claims against religious organizations.2 Courts should not foreclose a
victim's right to recover unnecessarily. The First Amendment immuni-
ties granted to religious organizations in L.L.N. and Pritzlaff were su-
perfluous to the direct claim. This suggests that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court went out of its way to protect religious organizations.
The L.L.N. court's First Amendment analysis provides further evi-
dence that L.L.N. is a convoluted attempt to protect religious organiza-
tions. Pritzlaff clearly leaves room for claims of negligent supervision
against religious organizations. 2'° The court in L.L.N., as did the court
in Pritzlaff, relied on policy issues to protect religious organizations, but
L.L.N. used convoluted reasoning to bar the First Amendment claim
instead of directly stating it was deciding a policy issue.
The majority's reliance on interpreting Clauder's vow of celibacy as
the basis for barring the First Amendment claim is, as the dissent
clearly points out, of no legal significance.' Clearly, the court could
208. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
209. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996) ("A court should be espe-
cially reluctant to volunteer to tackle a First Amendment issue relating to establishment of
religion and the prohibition of the free exercise of religion.").
210. "Although state inquiry into the training and supervision of clergy is a closer issue
than inquiry into hiring and retention practices because under some limited circumstances,
such questions might be able to be decided without determining questions of church law and
policies .... Id. at 791. The court did state such analysis would be banned in many in-
stances, but again relied not on entanglement issues but on policy issues. Id. ("Any award of
damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over future affairs of
a religious denomination .... ). Arguably, the majority in L.L.N. conducted the type of in-
vasive review of religious dogma that it claims is to be avoided-i.e., conducting an invasive
analysis to protect a religious organization, but not to hold it liable. To allow invasive review
to protect a religious organization seems inconsistent.
211. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. Arguably, counsel for L.L.N.
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analyze Clauder's relationship with L.L.N. without reviewing Clauder's
vow of celibacy because this vow has no relevance to the negligent su-
pervision claim.12 The facts of L.L.N. construct a scenario in which
Wisconsin could have allowed claims for negligent supervision against
religious organizations.2 3 The court needed only to apply neutral rules
of agency, as it would for a secular entity. In determining this agency
relationship, the court did not need to consider religious doctrine.
Finally, L.L.N.'s broad implications give religious organizations
blanket immunity from suit. By not allowing negligent supervision
should have never even mentioned "celibacy" during oral argument. 563 N.W.2d at 444.
Counsel claimed that Hebl's witness of initial incident should have provoked an inquiry by
Hebl because the incident showed Clauder "had no regard for his vow of celibacy." Id at
444. As the dissent states, "[n]one of L.L.N.'s claims against the Diocese even mentions the
word 'celibacy."' Id. at 451 (Bradley, J., dissenting). It follows that had L.L.N.'s counsel
never mentioned celibacy in oral argument, he would not have granted the majority its First
Amendment bar to the negligent supervision claim.
212. Id. at 451 (Bradley, J., dissenting). L.L.N.'s situation can be compared to secular
adult relationships in which a court, in interpreting the negligent supervision claim, could
easily apply neutral principles of law. For example, a relationship could exist between reha-
bilitative counselor and patient. Arguably, the only reason celibacy is relevant is to this
claim is its bizarre way of giving notice and barring the claim simultaneously. Justice Brad-
ley's point, and this author agrees, is that regardless of the celibacy issue, Hebl witnessed
what a jury could find to be "sexually assaultive" behavior, which has nothing to do with
celibacy, but everything to do with a negligent supervision claim.
213. The dissent lays out what is necessary for the negligent supervision claim:
[T]he record must support the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
following issues: 1) that Clauder was an employee of the Diocese at all relevant
times; 2) that Clauder engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward T.E., and later
used his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit L.L.N.; 3) that Hebl knew
or should have known that Clauder engaged in sexually harmful behavior toward
T.E.; and 4) that Hebl's knowledge is imputable to the Diocese.
Id. at 448 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Clearly, a court could apply neutral principles of law to
each step of this analysis. As stated, other jurisdictions have found that negligent supervision
claims do not interfere with the constitution. For example, in Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn, the New York Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not
bar negligent supervision and retention claims because imposition of such liability would not
violate constitutional and statutory guarantees of free exercise of religion and separation of
church and State. The court, under a free exercise analysis, found that "[R]eligious entities
have some duty to prevent injuries incurred by persons in their employ whom they have rea-
son to believe will engage in injurious conduct." 229 A.D.2d 159, 165, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791,796
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citing Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996));
L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d
383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Gallas v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N & S Am., 587
N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). The
Illinois Court of Appeals held, under a free exercise analysis, that a claim of negligent super-
vision against a religious organization would not require a court to interpret religious doc-
trine. See Bevin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) ("We cannot conclude
from plaintiffs' complaint that their cause of action against [the church] will infringe upon, or
place a burden upon, the church's freedom to exercise its religion.").
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
claims, arguably the most neutral of all recovery claims, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has sealed the opening Pritzlaff might have allowed for
victims to recover from religious organizations. For victims of sexual
abuse by clergy members, this may mean there is no legal recourse
against the religious organization, no matter how egregious the organi-
zation's conduct. Courts may decide differently if approached with a
case in which the sexual misconduct breaks a state law, such as a rape or
pedophile situation. However, religious organizations now have free
reign to place its employees anywhere, no matter how predatory the
employee's behavior may be. This is not the kind of religious freedom
the First Amendment was meant to protect.
If Wisconsin was concerned about infringing on the First Amend-
ment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court could have installed a safety meas-
ure to ensure that possible claims of negligent supervision against re-
ligious organizations do not unduly encroach on the organization's
rights guaranteed by the Federal or Wisconsin State Constitutions. To
ensure this, the Supreme Court should require a stricter negligent su-
pervision claim.t Thus, it could permit a claim against a religious or-
ganization only when the harm to the plaintiff is substantially certain to
result or when the church disregards a high risk of harm to the plain-
tiff.215 Or the court could adopt an even stricter standard and only per-
mit a claim against a religious organization if the organization had ac-
tual knowledge or constructive knowledge putting it on notice and
causing inquiry into the potential risk of harm. If the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court finds the safeguard of heightened pleadings insufficient, it
can supplement it with a stricter theory of negligent supervision and
protect the constitutional rights of religious organizations.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court could have also required a height-
ened standard of pleading for claims of negligent supervision against a
214. This would be similar to the court limiting the definition of defamation to ensure
the strength of the claim. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see
also Daryl L. Wiesen, Note, Following The Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balancing
Approach to Religious Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291 (1995). Wiesen analyzes how the Supreme
Court limited the definition and damages of the tort claim for defamation, arguing that
courts should apply this theory for the tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against religious organizations and clergy. Id. at 292.
215. Judge Spinden, of the Missouri Court of Appeals, previously suggested (in a con-
curring opinion of a decision the court later withdrew) this stricter negligent supervision
claim for claims against religious organizations. Gray v. Ward, 1996 WL 364794 (Mo. App.
W.D. July 2, 1996) (Spinden, J., concurring) (opinion withdrawn and cause ordered trans-
ferred to the Missouri Supreme Court, Oct. 22, 1996).
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religious organization, much like the one required for fraud . 6 The goal
of protecting the religious freedom of a religious organization is impor-
tant enough to require that plaintiffs plead the operative facts with par-
ticularity 7 for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss. 8 Specifically, a
plaintiff should be required to plead that the diocese had actual or con-
structive knowledge putting it on notice and causing inquiry into the po-
tential risk of harm. Therefore, if there exists a risk, and the Diocese
had notice to inquire, it was obligated to inquire.
VI. CONCLUSION
Religious organizations do not have blanket immunity from tortious
behavior.1 More specifically, public sentiment mandates that religious
organizations may no longer learn of a priest's sexual misconduct and
promptly ship the priest off to another parish where it often happens
again.' Others have suggested solutions such as mandatory reporting
statutes for religious organizations.21 Any court's analysis must first
delicately balance the interests of both the state and the religious or-
ganization to guarantee both the rights endowed to each by federal and
state constitutions. The principles involved are vague, and if there is a
doubt whether state laws intrude upon a religious organization's doc-
trine, a court should assume that the laws do because any analysis of a
religious organization's internal decision making will necessarily inter-
216. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b), states, "[iln all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
217. See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1991) (imposing a heightened stan-
dard of pleading on claims of negligent hiring and retention).
218. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
219. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ("The
[Establishment CIlause does not grant religious organizations blanket immunity from suit.").
220. See Lisa M. Smith, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes May Encourage the Catholic Church to Report Priests Who Molest Children, 18 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REV. 409,412 (1994). Smith attempts to head off future litigation by promoting
the idea that religious organizations should mandatorily report sexual misconduct of its
clergy. Id. at 414. She uses the Fourth Circuit's decision in Forest Hills Early Learning Cen-
ter. v. Lukhard, 661 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Va. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 846 F.2d 260 (4th
Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989), as an example that reporting statutes do not
violate the Catholic Church's free exercise of religion. See Smith, supra, at 414.
Courts also attempt to increase a religious organizations liability by making the statute
of limitations more permissible. See, e.g., Franis S. Ainsa, Permissive Statute of Limitation
Policies, 36 CATH. LAw 83 (1995). This will not work in Wisconsin because the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is unwilling relax statute of limitations' mandates. See Pritzlaff v. Archdio-
cese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996).
221. See Smith, supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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pret religious doctrine.
If a court's analysis focuses on the Establishment Clause, a court
must find it can apply "neutral principles" of law to a religious organiza-
tions' secular behavior.2n Under a free exercise analysis, constitutional
level of review under Wisconsin law dictates that a court must find a re-
ligious organization has a sincere belief that the state's intrusion is bur-
densome. Furthermore, the state must prove it has a compelling state
interest in intruding upon the religious doctrine and that its chosen
means is the least restrictive means for doing so.2 While the federal
standard is somewhat dynamic on this point, Wisconsin courts can rely
on the state standard.
Most theories of recovery would violate the Wisconsin Constitution
because they require the interpretation of religious doctrine or do not
meet the compelling interest/least restrictive means test. The only the-
ory of recovery that satisfies these tests is a claim of negligent supervi-
sion because it is the least intrusive on religious doctrine. '
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in L.L.N. v. Clauder allowed the
plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision because of an exception it
found in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, which otherwise stands
for the rule that Wisconsin will not allow claims that intrude on relig-
ious doctrine. The dissent was correct in noting that the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's decision in L.L.N. unnecessarily decided a First
Amendment issue because the court had already (erroneously) found
for summary judgment for the Diocese. Furthermore, had the court
correctly found a material issue of fact existed, the First Amendment
did not bar L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim because negligent su-
pervision claims can be decided on neutral principles of law, and thus
do not entangle the court in religious doctrine.
Finally, if the state wants more protection for religious organiza-
tions, it can limit negligent supervision to a strict definition. Wisconsin
could further insure a religious organization's constitutional rights if the
state requires a heightened standard of pleading for negligent supervi-
sion claims against religious organizations.
Because victims of clergy's sexual misconduct need compensation
for injury, and because religious organizations have not effectively
ended this kind of behavior on the part of their clergy, Wisconsin
should have allowed plaintiffs to recover from religious organizations
222. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 41, 51-52 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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under negligent supervision claims. To ensure that the state does not
excessively entangle itself in religious doctrines and canons or limit the
free exercise of religious organizations, Wisconsin should avoid theories
of recovery attempted in other jurisdictions that unnecessarily intrude
upon religious doctrine. The claim of negligent supervision satisfies the
problem, is least intrusive to religious doctrine, can be decided on neu-
tral principles of law, yet still allows an injured plaintiff recourse for re-
covery.
FAYE M. HAMMERSLEY

